Kojève on Kant's Critique of Practical Reason

[The below is an extremely rough and problematic translation of an extremely long footnote in Kojève's book on Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. It will be substantially revised and corrected. And a proper and entirely different translation by Hager Weslati is forthcoming: https://www.penguinrandomhouse.com/books/741202/kant-by-alexandre-kojeve/]

In the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), from the point of view that interests us here, the situation becomes extremely complicated and absolutely unsustainable, but it would be too lengthy to interpret this text in this place. Let's just say this. Duty (discursively developed in the famous "Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason") is presented (cf. § 7 and Note) as a "Fact of Reason," meaning an immediate and irreducible "given," and as "the only Fact of Pure Reason."

In the Critique of Practical Reason (1788), from the point of view that interests us here, the situation becomes extremely complicated and absolutely unsustainable, but it would be too lengthy to interpret this text in this place. Let's just say this. Duty (discursively developed in the famous "Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason") is presented (cf. § 7 and Note) as a "Fact of Reason," meaning an immediate and irreducible "given," and as "the only Fact of Pure Reason." In particular, this "Fact" cannot be deduced "from the Consciousness of Freedom, because this Consciousness is not given to us beforehand [to the given of Duty]", because this would require an "Intellectual Intuition" that humans, by definition, do not possess. Consequently, this "Fact" is a theoretical "Evidence" of the Platonic-Cartesian type, which Kant has, moreover, always rejected [rightly so] and for which he here apologizes, so to speak, for introducing by highlighting that this is the only case where he does it. But this "apology" (which is, moreover, implicit) is certainly not a justification in our eyes, nor, in fact, in those of Kant himself. It is impossible to base the as-if of discursive moral faith on this "Evidence." For if Theology could be founded on or deduced from this theoretical Evidence (and it must be theoretical, since it precedes and conditions the "practical" evidence of Freedom), it would be a Truth and not an as-if. Therefore, if Theology is a Faith, it either cannot be deduced from the theoretical Evidence in question, or this evidence is just a pseudo-evidence itself, that is, a fundamentally subjective assertion. Let's see what Kant himself says about it. In the "Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals" (which therefore predates the Critique by three years and announces/introduces it), he explicitly admits the existence of a "hard and fast" fact: on one hand, the notion of Freedom is deduced from the Duty (irreducible) of the Feeling of Duty, but on the other hand, the notion of Duty is deduced from that of Freedom (cf. ibid.; IV, 450, 18-29); he seems to resolve the difficulty by admitting that Freedom is a given (from which the notion of Duty can be deduced, without presupposing it); more precisely, the notion of Freedom itself is deduced from an irreducible Fact or Given of Introspection, namely the subjective experience of the Faculty of the a priori, "by which man distinguishes himself from all other things and even from himself as affected by objects" (ibid., 452, 9-453, 15). For us, this refers to Kant's appeal to the Fact ("defined") of Discourse (that is, the brute Fact of Discourse, posited as true in regard to the Axiom of Error); yet, this is an authentically Hegelian, or even atheistic, "Beginning," from which it is impossible to "deduce" a notion of the Beyond ("God" and "Immortality"), because the "Future World" is then the human world that completes History: no true Discourse without Freedom, and if Freedom, then the (negating or creating) Action of Struggle and Labor, that is, History culminating in the universal and homogeneous State, where the Sage-Citizen emits the uni-total or circular Discourse that is Truth. Thus, we find ourselves back in the situation found in the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, where the "Feeling of Duty" (the "moral law") is an irreducible Given from which the notion of Freedom is deduced. For us, this is a mistake by Kant: on one hand, Introspection actually contains the famous "moral law" (formulated in § 7 of the Critique) not as an irreducible Given (this being [positively] the "Desire of desire" [realizing itself as Struggle → Labor] and [negatively] "Boredom"), but as a very derived notion [from the Desire of Desire and appearing, moreover, only towards the end of History, precisely with Kant]; on the other hand, by admitting this "Law" as an irreducible theoretical Given, that is, as "Evidence" of the Platonic-Cartesian type, it makes the System, which discursively develops this supposed "Given," contradictory (in the last analysis: theistic or "theological" because the "conscience" is non-discursive; the "System" that implies it cannot therefore deduce itself, that is, demonstrate itself). Indeed, if the "moral law" is a theoretical "Evidence," it must be discursively developed in such a way as to give a Definition of Man: Man is the being who acts so that his Action Project is a "universal law"; the Meaning of this Definition corresponds to the Essence of Man (in the "Greek" sense of the word), by definition everywhere and always, that is, necessarily, identical to itself; this means that Man is not free, that what he claims to be his "moral law" (his "Project") is in reality nothing other than the natural "universal law"; however, as Kant himself foresaw, Discourse presupposes Freedom; thus, it is contradictory to say that the "moral law" is an irreducible theoretical Given (because if it were, one could not speak, nor, in particular, formulate this "law" [in fact natural] discursively). If one wants to "transform" this error of Kant into truth (which proves to be such by the non-contradictory inclusion in the uni-total Discourse), it is necessary to "reverse" the situation and deduce the notion of the "moral law" from the irreducible Given of Freedom (more precisely: from the irreducible Given of the Desire of desire realized by the Action of Struggle → Labor, from which the notion of Freedom = Negativity is deduced). But then we are back in full Hegelianism, or even atheism: the "moral law" thus deduced must be interpreted differently than Kant does, and this "Law," correctly interpreted, excludes any possibility of deducing the notion of Transcendence (and therefore of "God" and "Immortality"). Indeed (as we intend to demonstrate throughout our exposition, even in summary, of the Hegelian System of Knowledge), Freedom or Negativity is not pure Nothingness only insofar as it exists empirically as negating or creating Action of Struggle → Labor, which develops over extended Duration as universal History, so that the very notion of discursive Truth only makes sense if this creative History has an end and can thus "summarize" itself in and through or as the uni-total or circular Discourse, which is nothing other nor more than the non-contradictory discursive development of the notion of Freedom (which irreducibly opposes Man to Nature and which derives its Meaning from the irreducible Given of the Desire-of-desire, which exists empirically as the Action of Struggle → Labor, this generating Discourse of any kind [p. 77] (which can thus be discursively deduced and which defines the notion of Liberty), this Discourse, when it closes upon itself, being, (as a whole, that is to say, in its result), the discursive demonstration of Liberty which, in the final analysis, engenders it. This discursive development of the notion of Freedom (defined at the beginning, in and through a Definition-project, as an Action-Project) can be, at its end, summarized, if one wishes, as Kant did in his 'Fundamental Law of Pure Practical Reason [= Liberty]': 'Act in such a way that the maxim of your will [that is, the project of your action] can at all times be valid simultaneously as a guiding principle of a [spatially] universal legislation,” (V, 30, 38-39). However, the Hegelian interpretation of the meaning of this 'Law' will be radically different from that given by Kant himself. In this 'correct' interpretation (that is, not leading to Contra-diction, or even to Theology), the 'Fundamental Law' means: 'Govern the universal and homogeneous state [co-eternal and co-extensive with extended Duration] in such a way that it remains identical to itself, or at least do not act in a way to disturb it, when it exists empirically, and, when it does not yet exist or exists not everywhere (but only somewhere, that is, as a 'germ'), act in a way to hasten its coming or, at the very least, to not hinder, that is, it is precisely to proceed in Duration to facilitate its access to empirical existence. Why? Because on the freedom of the individual (as Project of Action) which as that Desire of the desire which is a Desire for Recognition and exists empirically for you and for others (as Accomplished Work) only in and through the Struggle → Labour, which cannot stop creating History (= Historical, human, 'artificial' World) by denying Nature (= the Given) until the Desire for Recognition is fully satisfied, which can only be done in and through the universal and homogeneous State. Now, if the Work accomplished in this State satisfies the anthropogenic Desire, Man may not despise himself without needing to hope for anything beyond this State (his only discursively "justifiable" Hope being, before the advent of this State, the subjective Certainty of its hoped-for coming, that is, Faith in the future universal and homogeneous State). Consequently, the Faith that the non-contradictory discursive development of the notion of Liberty engenders is a Faith in the 'future world' historical or human, and it cannot, by becoming itself discursive, involve any notion of Transcendence, so that it is impossible to deduce from it, without contradicting oneself, the notions of 'God' and 'Immortality', as Kant wanted to do. Kant seems, moreover, to have realized this already in the Critique of Pure Reason itself. For there he says this: 'Liberty is, however, the only one among all the Ideas of speculative Reason [that is, theoretical] of which we know (wissen) a priori the possibility, without however understanding (einzusehen) it, because it is the condition (Bedingung [in the sense of ratio essendi]) of the moral law that we know [and which is the ratio cognoscendi of Freedom]. But the Ideas of God and Immortality are not conditions of the moral law, but only conditions... of the purely practical use of our pure Reason; therefore, we cannot claim to know and understand (einzusehen), I do not say only the Reality [objective], but even the Possibility of these Ideas. But [these Ideas] are nevertheless the conditions of the application of the morally determined Will... Therefore, their Possibility can and must be admitted (angenommen) in this practical relation, without however knowing or understanding them theoretically. For this last requirement (Forderung), it is enough, in the practical intention, that these Ideas contain no internal Impossibility (Contradiction)" (V, 4, 7-21). As for this last point, Kant is simply mistaken, because the notions of "God" and "Immortality" are, in fact, contra-dictory notions of the "Square-Circle" type. But that is not important for the moment. What is important is that Kant recognizes that these two notions (which, for us, are one and the same) cannot be deduced from the theoretical notion of the "moral law," not even as merely "possible" (in our terminology: as what is without being objectively-real) [nor, by definition, exist empirically]. In the Critique of Practical Reason, Kant tries to "deduce" these notions from the practical application of the "moral law," but it is easy to see that the "deduction" found there is by no means "undisputed." In fact, he can deduce them (correctly) only by assuming (as an irreducible Given) the efficacy of the Action performed by Man in this world in function of the "moral law" (cf. V, 722, 4-25) and therefore the impossibility of Satisfaction in this world (cf. V, 124, 7-20). Now, this assumption ("gratuitous") is nothing other than the fundamental Postulate of all Religion (which presupposes, in fact, as a human phenomenon, the anthropogenic Desire for Recognition, in the form of the sole refusal of Self-Contempt), which has nothing to do either with "Theory," or with "Morality," or with [p. 78] Philosophy as such. We thus fall back into the situation found in the “Canon” of the Critique of Pure Reason where it was said that the very notion of Duty (= 'moral Law') makes no sense if one does not presuppose those of 'God' and 'Future World' (= 'Immortality') (cf. III, 520, 17-24) [which, for us, can only be deduced from the religious Postulate]. However, Kant seems to have realized this himself, since two years after the Critique of Practical Reason, he says, in the Critique of Judgment, this: 'But speculative reason [i.e., theoretical] does not understand (sicht ein) at all the possibility of the executing (Ausführbarkeit) of this [i.e., of Duty] (neither on the side of our own physical capability nor on that of the cooperation [Mitwirkung] of Nature); on the contrary, it is obliged (muss), as far as we can judge reasonably, to take, [if it starts] from such causes [purely natural], such a success of our good moral conduct (Wohlverhaltens), [i.e., a success obtained] from Nature alone (within us and outside us) [and] without admitting God and Immortality, for an unfounded (ungeründete) and vain (nichtigen) expectation (Erwartung; the analogue of Hope, Hoffnung), however well-intentioned, and, if it could have of this [its] judgment a total certainty (Gewissheit), consider the moral law itself as a simple illusion (Täuschung) of our Reason in a practical intention (Rücksicht)" (V, 471, 21-28). Kant continues by saying that, the notions of God and Immortality not being contra-dictory, Reason, even theoretical, must admit them (and deduce from them the efficacy of the "moral law") if it does not want to contradict itself, which it would do if it denied them, since it accepts itself and therefore cannot avoid Contradiction in the System by introducing them. What counts is, on one hand, the fact that Kant explicitly admits an irreducible conflict between "Speculative Reason" (= philosophical) and "Moral Faith" in God and Immortality. For he says that if Reason were absolutely sure of itself, the "Duty" and therefore the "Faith" that follows from it, would be "vain" and "without foundation," that is, purely "illusory." To save the "Faith," Kant must therefore renounce the very idea of purely theoretical discursive Truth and thus give himself over to Scepticism (theistic or theological), which is perfectly explained by the fact that Kant's System includes a gap as soon as its theology (which only discursively develops the "moral Faith") is eliminated; yet, this "Moral Scepticism" equivalent to the "moral Faith," contradicts the entire work of the Critique of Pure Reason, where the Categories founded a certain knowledge that could be opposed to Scepticism of any kind. What counts, on the other hand, is the fact that for Theoretical Reason (= Philosophy), as Kant already said in the Critique of Pure Reason (cf. III, 520, 17-24), the notion of Duty and therefore that of Freedom (which, in fact and for us, as for Kant, have no meaning if Freedom is inoperative or ineffective and Duty unachievable) have meaning (and practical value) only if they are associated with the notions of God and Immortality (which, for us, are conflated in the notion of Transcendence, that is, of the Beyond of the Given-Being or of Spatio-temporality). According to Kant, these notions must therefore be taken/given/posited and understood as a whole. Yet, for us, this "whole" cannot be admitted or "deduced," or even "demonstrated" unless one postulates the inefficacy of Action in this world while aligning oneself with the Desire for recognition, which can only come to the mind of a man of religious temperament and which inevitably leads to contradiction, if the Religious elaborates a discursive Theology (although it is possible, as Buddhism proves, to be both Religious and Atheist, provided one seeks the Satisfaction supposed to be impossible in this world and the Beyond in total Annihilation: Nirvana), because the notion of God = Immortality excludes that of Freedom, while, without the latter, one cannot "deduce" the fact of Discourse, so that one is forced either to remain silent or to speak by contradicting oneself, since it would then be necessary to say that it is impossible to speak (which is generally expressed, implicitly, by speaking of a God by definition ineffable). Kant must have suspected this since, in the Critique of Practical Reason, he rejects the possibility of deducing the discursive content of the "moral Faith" from the sole theoretical notion of the "moral law" (and appeals to the Postulate, in fact religious, of the impossibility of its execution in the extended Duration of empirical Existence, nor even of Spatio-temporality as such or of the Given-Being, not to mention objective Reality). He deduces from this notion only that of Freedom (cf. V, 4, 7-13). Moreover, he recognizes the "vicious circle" of this deduction. In other words, he admits, at least for us, that the notions of the "moral law" and "Freedom" have, in the last analysis, one and the same Meaning [which, for us, has [p. 79] its ultimate source in the awareness of the Desire of Desire, that is, of the Desire for Recognition and Boredom]: these two notions [which, for us, are one and the same] must also be taken/given/posited and understood en bloc.