Strauss on the World-State

in relation to passages in Wolfson's Philo

Strauss on “World-State” and Wolfson’s Philo [See also Jonas’ negative review of Wolfson’s two-volume Philo and especially Emil Fackenheim’s 19-pp critique, with reference to Strauss]

Scholem, in reviewing Leo Schwartz’s Wolfson of Harvard: Portrait of a Scholar: “...the book does not once mention the name of Leo Strauss, undoubtedly the other great star of the past generation in the field of Jewish medieval philosophy and the author of one of the most extraordinary studies of Spinoza's Critique of Religion. The intricate personal and philosophical relations between these two men of genius if discussed would have been a highlight of the book.” (“The Sleuth from Slobodka,” TLS Nov 23, 1979, p. 16).

Strauss: Open society ruled by undiluted natural law presupposes that knowledge can be the element of social life → rejection of esotericism.

Philo finds a prohibition against receiving or conferring initiation into "occult rites and mysteries" (teletas kai mysterias). He describes them as" imposture and buffoonery," as" mummeries and mystic fables." He objects to them on the ground that they shut themselves up "in profound darkness and reserve their benefits for three or four alone," arguing that "if these things are good and profitable," they should be produced "in the midst of the market-place," where "you might extend them to every man and thus enable all to share in security a better and happier life." Like the author of the Wisdom of Solomon, who, as we have seen, draws upon Aristotle's saying that "the divine cannot be envious," he paraphrases a similar saying from Plato to the efiect that "virtue has no room in her home for envy." (Wolfson I 37)

[Strauss:] But:

No more does he hesitate to use the language of mysteries in his description of the religion of Scripture. The covenant into which the children of Israel and the strangers that were among them as well as their future generations entered with God through the agency of Moses is described by him as an act by which Moses "initiated them into the mysteries" (mystagōgōn). Within these mysteries of Moses, as in the Eleusinian mysteries, there are lesser and greater mysteries (Wolfson 43)

In another place he describes those who have been "initiated in to the true mysteries of the Existent" as "those to whose lot has fallen a generously gifted nature and an education in all respects blameless" and who therefore "do not attribute to God any of the properties of a created being." (Wolfson I 46)

Finally, in one place, he seems to indicate that allegorical method, whereby the true knowledge of God and of virtue is to be extracted from the letter of the Law, was regarded by him as a mystery; for he speaks of those who are not versed

in the allegorical method as those "who are not initiated in allegory," and allegory itself is described by him as "the nature which loves to hide itself." (Wolfson I 48)

From all this we may gather that by those who have been initiated into mysteries he means men of good native abilities and proper education who have succeeded in mastering their passions and in acquiring a true knowledge of the existence and nature of God. The knowledge of the existence of God, according to him, may come to them either indirectly through God's actions in the world or directly through revelation. The knowledge of the true nature of God means to him the knowledge that God is incorporeal and unlike any of the created beings, and also that by a special grace He

has endowed men with a part of His own power of freedom of action and has revealed to them a Law which is to guide them in their free action. These things are called by him

mysteries tor two reasons. First, they are called mysteries because the true knowledge of them lies hidden in Scripture, and has to be extracted from it by means of the allegorical method, which requires instruction. For this use of the term mysteries Philo had ample justification, since by his time that term had come to be applied to all matters of science which required instruction. Philo himself uses the term mysteries in this sense when he says of Joseph that he "was both the initiated and the initiator in the mysteries of dreams." Second, they are called mysteries as a challenge to the heathen mysteries. Philo seems to say to the votaries of the heathen mysteries: the communion with God and the salvation and the better way of life which you all aspire after are not to be attained by the sacred rites which you practice in secret by your mummeries and mystic fables, but by obedience to the teachings and practices of the Law of Moses. These are the true mysteries. (Wolfson I 49)

“...‘the culminating rite of Sabazios was a sacred marriage in which the god, represented by the golden adder, was drawn through the bosom of his worshipper; and here the worshipper, whether man or woman, is conceived as female, being none other than

the bride of the god.’ All this had for its purpose the establishment of a symbolic union between the votary and the deity. Philo undoubtedly was acquainted with this kind of

rite, and by using in this passage the symbolism of marriage between God and men he meant to challenge all such rites of heathen mysteries. All these mummeries, he seems to say, are unnecessary. There is an unbroken and constant union between God and men, for God is in a sense always in men; He is the source of virtue in them, He has endowed them with a part of His own power to act with unrestrained freedom, and He directly communicates to them His will, whenever they prove themselves worthy of it.

This then is the meaning of Philo's comparison of the covenant between Israel and God to initiation into mysteries.

Let us now see what Philo, on the show of his own explanation, means by his injunction of silence on the part of those who have been initiated into what he calls mysteries.” (Wolfson I 51)

To begin with, he means thereby that man is to be modest about the special grace he may receive from God in aiding him to overcome the passions of his body, and he is not toboast about it….Then, he means by his injunction of silence that the allegorical method of the interpretation of Scripture, whereby one is to discover its hidden mysteries, is not to be taught to persons who do not possess the required qualifications for it…This need of intellectual and moral qualifications for the study of the inner truths of Scripture is stressed by Philo in many other passages…. For Philo to have made intellectual and moral qualifications a condition for the study of the inner philosophic meaning of Scripture was only to follow a tradition common in Greek philosophy. There was, to begin with, Aristotle's theory as to the subordination of moral to intellectual virtues and as to the need of proper training in order to attain intellectual virtue. Philo has only slightly revised this view by making moral virtue a condition of intellectual virtue, and this under the influence of certain religious preconceptions of Judaism…. The term mystery that Philo applies to the allegorical method and his warning not to blab it out to those who have not been initiated mean nothing more than that rule laid down by philosophers with regard to certain doctrines and by rabbis with regard to discoursing on the work of creation and on the work of the chariot and on the profundities of the Law. (Wolfson I 51-55)

[LS:] cf.:

The literalists of Philo are presented by him as being conscious of problems and difficulties in the text of Scripture, as pursuing investigations of their own, as being able to match wits with captious critics, and as discovering moral lessons in scriptural stories….His main criticism of them is that, by their refusing to interpret texts philosophically, they sometimes take Scripture to affirm views, especially about God, which upon a closer examination of their own conscience they would themselves find objectionable. Take, for instance, the verse stating that "God took to heart (enethumethe) that He had made man upon the earth, and He thought upon it (dienothete); and God said, I will destroy man whom I have made from off the face of the earth." This verse, he says, if not interpreted philosophically, would imply that" the Creator repented… (Wolfson I 59)

In his attempt to interpret Scripture in terms of philosophy, Philo assumes that scriptural texts have a twofold meaning, a literal (rete) or obvious (phanera) meaning and an underlying meaning (huponoia) . The underlying meaning he describes by a variety of terms, among them also the term allegory (allegoria), and to interpret a text according to its underlying meaning is therefore described as to allegorize (allegorein).he underlying meaning of a text as well as the allegorical interpretation of it is said by him to be "obscure to the many," to be clear only to "those who can contemplate bodiless and naked facts," to appeal only to "the few who study soul characteristics rather than bodily forms," and to be dear to "men who are capable of seeing." (Wolfson I 115)

LS: The precise problem is: if the truth cannot be told but to those who are φύσει [by nature] fit for it, the whole argument collapses. Except: there is a myth (in the literal meaning) which is universablly acceptable.

If the allegorical interpretation must not be divulged, the allegorical

interpretation divulged by Philo himself cannot be the allegorical

Interpretation.

[LS:] Cf. “With regard to the story of creation, commenting upon the verse which in the Septuagint reads, ‘and God finished on the sixth day His works,’ he says: "It is quite foolish

to think that the world was created in six days or in a space of time at all."" The term six is taken by him to mean" not a quantity of days, but a perfect number," (Wolfson 120). As for the other stories in what he calls the story of the creation of the world, he has four sets of statements. First, sometimes he rejects their literal meaning altogether. Second, however, in connection with the stories that God put man into the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it, that Adam gave names to the various animals, and that the serpent spoke, he sometimes accepts them all in their literal sense." Third, he sometimes advances two interpretations, a literal and an allegorical, both of them evidently of equal acceptance to him. He does this in connection with God's planting of a garden in Eden," His creation of Eve, and His making of garments for Adam and Eve. Fourth, sometimes he reproduces a literal interpretation in the name of" some persons," but expresses his own preference for an allegorical interpretation. This occurs in connection with the putting of man into the garden of Eden, the tree of life,' and the four rivers.’” (Wolfson I, 120-21) with: “The term mystery that Philo applies to the allegorical method and his warning not to blab it out to those who have not been initiated mean nothing more than that rule laid down by philosophers with regard to certain doctrines and by rabbis

with regard to discoursing on the work of creation and on the work of the chariot and on the profundities of the Law” (Wolfson I 55).

[LS:] Cf. “All these statements merely show that by the allegorical method Philo found it possible to explain away any narration of incident in Scripture that seemed to him to run counter to reason or expectation or to have some similarity with Greek myths, without necessarily impugning the historicity of the essential basic fact of the story. Indeed Cain did not build a city all by himself as the statement would literally imply, but still there is no doubting of the fact that Cain was a real person and the founder of a city….” (Wolfson I 125) with: “With regard to the legislative part of the Pentateuch, he makes two statements. On the one hand, as in the case of the non-legislative part, he says of it that the "laws of God-beloved men" are not to be taken literally, whenever their literal acceptance would compel one "to admit anything base or unworthy of their dignity." This, again, leaves it to the individual student of Scripture to decide for himself which laws in their literal sense are base and unworthy of their dignity. But, on the other hand, he denounces those of his own time who saw in the law an underlying meaning only and treated its literal meaning with easy-going neglect. The inner meaning and the external performance of the law are to him of equal importance” (Wolfson I 127) and “in several other passages, in connection with the laws of leprosy, kingship, and war, without mentioning that the laws in question are stated in the future indicative, but criticizing their literal meaning as being unreasonable on various grounds, he takes all of them to have some inner meaning. Finally in the case of one law, stated also in the future indicative, in one place he criticizes its literal meaning and interprets it allegorically, but in another place he accepts it as a law in its literal meaning” (Wolfson I 130). “...just as the powers are divided into beneficial and punitive, so also the angels are divided by him into beneficial and punitive. Thus two of the three visitors of Abraham, in their literal sense of angels, correspond to the two powers which they allegorically symbolize, one being beneficial and the other punitive.” (Wolfson I 381)

“In Opif. 2.7, where Aristotle is criticized, his view is described as that which believes that.the world is "uncreated and eternal" and similarly in Aet. 3.10, where he is praised, his view is described as that which believes that the world is "uncreated and indestructible." But evidently the criticism in the former place is meant only for the" uncreated" part of his view and the praise in the latter place is meant only for the "indestructible" part of his view.” (Wolfson I 295n5).

“The allegorical explanation of miracles by Philo is thus no denial of their historicity as events which actually took place, just as his occasional attempt at a rational explanation of them is no denial of the miraculous nature of those events. his therefore quite literally and without any equivocation of language that he could proclaim that "if anyone disbelieves these things, he neither knows God nor has ever sought to know Hirn; for if he did he would at once have perceived–aye, perceived with a firm apprehension–that these extraordinary and seemingly incredible events are but child's play to God." (Wolfson I 354).

Apply to Providence [connection to world-state; NRH 149-150 and note: “Yet the city must command, and even praise, such ways if they are used against the enemy. To avoid this self-contradiction, the city must transform itself into the ‘world-state.’ But no human being and no group of human beings can rule the whole human race justly. Therefore, what is divined in speaking of the ‘world-state’ as an all-comprehensive human society subject to one human government is in truth the cosmos ruled by God, which is then the only true

city, or the city that is simply according to nature because it is the only city which is simply just. Men are citizens of this city, or freemen in it, only if they are wise; their obedience to

the law which orders the natural city, to the natural law, is the same thing as prudence.]

“‘Providence or forethought is contented with paying regard to things in the world of the most

importance, just as in kingdoms and commands of army it pays regard to the cities and troops, not to some chance individual of the obscure and insignificant kind.’ Superficially this statement would seem to be nothing but a restatement of the Stoic doctrine ‘the gods attend to great matters; they neglect the small ones.’ But Philo could not have meant by it the same as the

Stoics. The Stoics meant by it to deny individual providence and to assert that what they call providence is merely the uniformity and unity and continuity and immutability of the universal laws of nature. Philo, however, did believe in individual providence. This is indirectly implied in his belief in miracles, which to him means that God may upset the universal laws of nature out of his care for certain favored individuals and it is directly expressed in his statement that God ‘guides and controls the universe by the law and right of an absolute sway, having a providential regard not only for those which are of greater importance, but also for those which appear to be of less importance.’ if as he says in this last-quoted statement that God's providential regard is not only for things which are "of greater importance" but also for things which are ‘of less importance,’ he certainly could not mean liy his previously quoted statement what it would superficially seem to mean, namely, that God sometimes actually neglects the individual because of this primary concern ‘for the whole human race’ or ‘for the whole world’ or for things ‘of the most importance.’ What he really means by this previously quoted statement is this: Providence is both universal and individual. Universal providence means the operation of the laws of nature. Individual providence includes among other things, the miraculous suspension of the laws of nature by God for the benefit of some individual. Such a miraculous intervention on the part of God in the order of nature, however, takes place only in the case of individuals who are especially deserving of it. ‘It is not possible with God that a wicked man should lose his good reward for a single good thing which he may have done among a great number of evil actions; nor, on the other hand, that a good man should escape punishment, and not suffer it, if among many good actions he has done wickedly in anything.’ This reflects a view similar to that expressed by rabbis in such statements as ‘the Holy One, blessed be He, does not withhold the reward of any creature’ and ‘he who says that the Holy One, blessed be He, overlooks any sins of man ought to forfeit his right to the protection of his life by law.’” (Wolfson II 292-94)

From Strauss’s handwritten annotations to “The Literary Character of the Guide”:

LS’ annotation to PAW 50 “The necessity of taking such an extraordinary measure was a

consequence of the long duration of the Diaspora. The secrets of the Torah, "the fountainhead of ancient Greek, and, consequently, also of Arabian wisdom." Wolfson I 163: “...Medians, then to Greece, and finally to the Romans’; but, on the other hand, Maimonides merely asserts that Jews had once cultivated the science of physics and metaphysics which they later neglected by reason of persecution. In Hebrew literature of a later period, legends appeared that Aristotle became converted to Judaism or even that he was of Jewish descent. This is how philosophy was made the handmaid of Scripture by Philo, and this is also how throughout the centuries of Christian, Moslem, and Jewish thought philosophy continued to be a handmaid. From this position, Spinoza sought to emancipate it in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, a philosophic work which, like the philosophic works of Philo, is written in the form of discussions of scriptural topics and verses. In his effort to emancipate philosophy from its ancillary position, he goes to the very root of the problem–the belief in revelation. By denying revelation, he reduces Scripture to the status of the works of the Greek poets, and as a result of this he revives the classical conception of Greek philosophers as to the relation between popular beliefs and philosophic thought.”

LS’ annotation to PAW 70 (text in “Literary Character”: “Neither can we discuss here the related questions as to whether the Maimonidean method of teaching the truth was influenced by a philosophic tradition; whether it is characteristic of a particular kind of philosophic literature; and whether, in accordance with the terminology of the philosophic tradition, the Guide ought not to be described rather as an exoteric work. If this description should ultimately prove correct, the meaning of the term ‘addition’ would have to undergo a profound change: it would not mean the decisively important secret teaching which is added to the conventional view, but rather the imaginative representation which is added to the undisguised truth.”) Wolfson II 189: “‘the polity as seen in various peoples is an addition to nature,’ and ‘different peoples have different customs and regulations which are extra inventions and additions,’ so that ‘the laws of the different states are additions to the right reason of nature.’ The expression ‘an addition to nature’ means here an excrescence upon nature, something adventitious to it and not in accordance with it.”

Another LS’ annotation to PAW 70 (text in “Literary Character”: “Since the contradictions in the Guide are concealed, we must briefly consider at least some of the ways of hiding contradictions. (1) The most obvious method is to speak of the same subject in a contradictory manner on pages far apart from each other. The symbol of this method is: a = b (page 15) - a ≠ b (page 379). Considering, however, the carelessness with which we usually read, one may reduce the distance between the pages to any positive number. (2) A variation of this method is to make one of the two contradictory statements in passing, as it were. A good example is Maimonides' incidental denial of the obligatory character of the entire sacrificial legislation.”) Wolfson II 244-45: “Finally he concludes: ‘And indeed, though the worshipers bring nothing else, in bringing themselves they offer the best sacrifices, the full and truly perfect oblation of noble living, honoring God, their Benefactor and Savior, with hymns and thanksgivings.’ Here, too, the wording and the sentiment reflect such verses as ‘We will render for bullocks the offering of our lips’; ‘Let my prayer be set forth before Thee as incense.’In this last statement of Philo there is also an intimation of that view which among the rabbis, after the destruction of the temple, gave rise to the statements that for those who cannot worship God by means of sacrifice, prayer may serve as a substitute, and that ‘prayer is greater than sacrifices.’”